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PER CURIAM. 
 Joanne Scheafnocker appeals the District Court=s order 
dismissing her complaint, on a finding that her wrongful levy 
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claim is time-barred.  She raises procedural due process issues 
because she did not receive any notice that the IRS had levied 
funds she held jointly with her ex-husband.  We conclude that 
Scheafnocker has sufficiently pleaded a constitutional claim 
with a distinct basis for jurisdiction.  Therefore, we will vacate 
the District Court‟s order, and remand the cause for it to 
consider the merits of her due process claim.   
   
I. 
 The merits of Scheafnocker‟s wrongful levy claim are 
undeveloped because the time-bar issue has been the focus of 
review in every instance.  Therefore, we briefly recite 
background information provided in the complaint, along with 
the procedural history of the case.
1 
 
 Appellant Joanne Scheafnocker and her ex-husband Fred 
Scheafnocker divorced in 1983.  Joanne Scheafnocker filed a 
child support case in Texas state court, where Fred 
Scheafnocker lives.  In 1988, Joanne placed a jointly issued 
check, the proceeds from the sale of their marital home, in a 
certificate of deposit from Equibank in North Huntingdon, 
Pennsylvania.  The certificate of deposit, issued in her name and 
that of her ex-husband, was to be left untouched pending 
settlement of the child support case.
2
  From the record, it is 
apparent that she later moved to California. 
                                                 
1 We accept as true all of the allegations contained in the 
complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 
curiam). 
 
2
 The certificate of deposit bore the following notation:  “Our 
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 The record also states that on October 7, 2002, the 
Internal Revenue Service assessed trust fund recovery penalties 
against Fred Scheafnocker and sent him a Notice to Levy for his 
failure to turn over taxes that he withheld from employees of his 
business in Texas.  The government levied the funds jointly held 
by Fred and Joanne Scheafnocker in the North Huntingdon bank 
on May 30, 2003.  Approximately fourteen months later, in July 
2004, Joanne Scheafnocker attempted to make a deposit into the 
account to “keep the account active,” discovering then that the 
funds were gone and that the account was closed.  She learned 
of the levy at this time.
3
  The government admits that it never 
sent Joanne Scheafnocker any notice of the levy. 
 
 Joanne Scheafnocker filed pro se an IRS Form 911 for 
taxpayer assistance in August 2004.  The Taxpayer Advocate 
denied the claim as time-barred on January 3, 2005.  On or about 
March 29, 2005, Scheafnocker filed pro se a “Petition for Lien 
or Levy Action” with the Tax Court, which dismissed her claim 
on May 31, 2005 for lack of jurisdiction.  In that petition, she 
                                                                                                             
terms - to be held in lieu of Texas court C.S. case resolution.  
J.S.”  The record does not explain why the child support issue 
has remained unresolved for such a protracted period of time. 
 
3
 In her complaint, Scheafnocker states that she attempted to 
make a deposit two years after the levy.  The appellate record 
corrects this time-frame to fourteen months.  This error does not 
materially alter her claim.  Her brief also explains that she 
contacted the bank at that time to make a deposit of $100 on the 
account, mindful of an earlier notice she had received from the 
Bank advising her that inactive accounts risk forfeiture to the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.   
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stated that the government failed to provide her with any notice 
of the levy.  Scheafnocker then filed pro se, on October 4, 2005, 
a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
California, where she resides.  In the pro se civil cover sheet, 
she describes her claim as a “violation of due process rights 
under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment [sic].”  She alleges 
“[p]laintiff, as co-owner, was never notified either by IRS or 
bank, denying any opportunity to make timely objection.”  In her 
prayer for relief, she states the following.   
 
1.  That this Court provide 
opportunity for Plaintiff to show all 
evidence and proof; 2.  That 
judgment be entered in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendant; 3.  
That entire amount of CD at time of 
seizure, plus bank interest from that 
day to the present, be returned to 
Plaintiff; 4.  That additional interest 
accrue for non-payment over 30 
days from judgment; 5.  That 
Plaintiff be awarded reimbursement 
for all related legal costs such as 
filing, and other further relief as 
this jury and court deem just and 
proper. 
   
Complaint 3, ECF No. 1.   
 The government filed a motion to dismiss asserting inter 
alia that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the suit 
(interpreted as a wrongful levy claim brought under 26 U.S.C. ' 
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7426) was time-barred, and because the government had 
sovereign immunity from her claims.  Upon the recommendation 
of the Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled that 
Scheafnocker=s wrongful levy claim could be regarded as a tax 
refund claim and, as such, deemed timely filed.
4
  The District 
Court then ordered the government to file an answer to 
Scheafnocker=s suit.  However, shortly after the government 
filed an answer, the Supreme Court held in an unrelated case 
that wrongful levy claims cannot be construed as refund claims. 
 See EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429 
(2007).  As a result, the District Court vacated its order.   
 
 The government then filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, reiterating its general jurisdictional arguments and 
asserting that the Eastern District of California was not the 
proper venue for this suit.  On February 4, 2008, the Magistrate 
Judge issued findings and a recommendation to deny the motion 
on the basis that, under precedent from the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, wrongful levy claims are subject to equitable 
tolling.  See Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 
1204, 1206-1207 (9th Cir. 1995).  However, on February 19, 
2008, the Magistrate Judge vacated this order stating the 
following.  
 
[T]he court stands by its findings in 
the February 4, 2008, findings and 
recommendations, but vacates them 
insofar as they recommend further 
adjudication on its merits.  The 
                                                 
4 The statute of limitations for a tax refund claim is two years 
from the time the tax was paid.  26 U.S.C. ' 6511(a). 
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merits of this action shall be 
adjudicated in the appropriate 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
' 1402(c).  This action is 
transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.  
 
Order 5, ECF No. 52.
5
 
 Upon transfer of the case to the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, the government filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the claim was 
time-barred.  The District Court granted the government=s 
motion, ruling that equitable tolling of a wrongful levy claim is 
not permitted.  See Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Wolckenhauer, 
215 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2000).    
 
II. 
 Scheafnocker does not challenge our opinion in Becton, 
which prohibits equitable tolling of wrongful levy claims 
brought under section 7426.  See id.  Instead, based upon the law 
of the case doctrine, she argues that the District Court erred by 
failing to apply Supermail, which permits equitable tolling.  
                                                 
5 28 U.S.C. ' 1402(c):  “Any civil action against the United 
States under subsection (e) of section 1346 of this title may be 
prosecuted only in the judicial district where the property is 
situated at the time of levy, or if no levy is made, in the judicial 
district in which the event occurred which gave rise to the cause 
of action.” 
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Scheafnocker also raises a due process claim arising from a lack 
of notice.  The law of the case argument is unavailing, but we do 
find that Scheafnocker has sufficiently pleaded a due process 
claim for which the District Court has jurisdiction.   
 
A. 
 “The „law of the case . . . doctrine posits that when a 
court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue 
to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same 
case.‟”  Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 191, 207 
(3d Cir.  2010) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 
618 (1983)).  We have a long history of adherence to the law of 
the case doctrine as a means of promoting not only finality, 
consistency and judicial economy, but also comity with other 
courts.  See, e.g., Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Leahy, 
193 F.2d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 1952).  The Supreme Court has also 
directed that although “[a] court has the power to revisit prior 
decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance 
. . . as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision 
was „clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.‟”  
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8). 
   
 When a magistrate judge has been directed by a district 
court to conduct hearings and issue a report and 
recommendation, such findings do not carry the force of law 
until accepted by the district court.  Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Dominick D'Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Here, the Magistrate Judge issued the findings and 
recommendation on February 4, 2004.  Fifteen days later, before 
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the District Court ruled on it, the Magistrate Judge vacated the 
findings and recommendation and transferred the case.
6 
 This 
makes it clear to us that there is nothing to which the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania owed any 
deference.  The Magistrate Judge=s order does contain some 
confusing language, to wit:  “the court stands by its findings in 
the February 4, 2008, findings and recommendations.”  Order 5, 
ECF No. 52.  These words, however, do not transform the 
Magistrate Judge=s unreviewed and ultimately vacated 
recommendation into the law of the case.
7
  Accordingly, with 
respect to Scheafnocker=s wrongful levy claims, we find no error 
in the District Court=s reliance upon Becton rather than 
Supermail on the issue of whether equitable tolling is available 
in wrongful levy claims brought under section 7426.
8
 
                                                 
6
 The Magistrate Judge is empowered to issue the transfer order, 
which is non-dispositive, without the approval of the District 
Court.  28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(A). 
 
7We further note that the transfer of the case to the Western 
District of Pennsylvania was dictated by 28 U.S.C. ' 1402(c), 
which expresses in unqualified terms the intention of Congress 
to adjudicate wrongful levy suits in the jurisdiction of the situs 
of the res.  
8
 In Becton, we found that, because the plaintiff was suing the 
United States, “sovereign immunity is implicated.”  Becton, 215 
F.3d at 345.  Sovereign immunity dictates that a private litigant 
cannot sue the United States unless the suit fits within a waiver 
to this immunity that is legislated by Congress.  Block v. North 
Dakota ex. rel. Bd. of University and School Lands, 461 U.S. 
273, 287 (1983); see also White-Squire v. United States Postal 
Service, 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).  We held that, 
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B. 
 Scheafnocker=s pro se complaint, however, also 
articulates a procedural due process claim that is distinct from 
her wrongful levy claim.  It is axiomatic that an „“elementary 
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.‟”  Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. C.I.R., 356 F.3d 290, 
295 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also Dee v. Borough 
of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2008).  Scheafnocker 
contends, and the government admits, that the Internal Revenue 
Service did not give her any notice of the levy or her right to 
challenge it.  She asserts that the government=s failure to provide 
notice denied her of any opportunity to have the merits of her 
wrongful levy claim reviewed.  Because her cause was denied 
by the Tax Advocate and was dismissed by the District Court as 
untimely, depriving her a review of the merits of her claim, her 
assertion of constitutional harm has substance.  We, therefore, 
                                                                                                             
although section 6532 waives sovereign immunity to allow 
wrongful levy claims against the government, the time 
limitations expressed therein must be strictly construed.   
Becton, 215 F.3d at 345.  As a result, we held that “the failure to 
file a timely wrongful levy claim prior to the expiration of the 
time limitation in section 6532(c) deprives the district court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. at 353.  Becton, therefore, 
eliminates the District Court=s jurisdiction over Scheafnocker=s 
suit to the extent that she asserts a wrongful levy claim.  
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must ascertain whether the District Court has jurisdiction to 
review her due process claim.
9
 
   
 The government argues that the District Court lacks 
jurisdiction because Scheafnocker=s suit, however characterized, 
is barred by sovereign immunity.  We apply the rule that the 
federal government is generally immune from suit, except where 
Congress has expressly articulated an exception to the immunity. 
 Becton, 215 F.3d at 345; Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556, 
558 (3d Cir. 2004).  However, Scheafnocker seeks two different 
remedies for the alleged constitutional due process violation:  
she requests money damages, or in the alternate, an opportunity 
to present the merits of her wrongful levy claim.  As we will 
explain below, Scheafnocker=s due process claim for money 
damages is barred by sovereign immunity.  However, we 
conclude that, to the extent that she seeks a purely procedural 
remedy, the District Court does have jurisdiction to consider her 
claim.  
 
 Jurisdiction for constitutional claims seeking money 
damages against the United States is grounded in the Tucker 
Act.  28 U.S.C. ' 1491(a).  The Act authorizes the Court of 
Claims to “render judgment upon any claim against the United 
States founded . . . upon the Constitution.”  Id.; see also United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); Chabal v. Reagan, 
822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1987).  Moreover, the District Court 
                                                 
9
 „“[I]t is familiar law that a federal court always has jurisdiction 
to determine its own jurisdiction.‟”  White-Squire, 592 F.3d at 
456 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) 
(citation omitted)). 
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is authorized to hear Tucker Act claims that do not exceed 
$10,000.  28 U.S.C. ' 1346(a)(2); Chabal, 822 F.2d at 353.  
However, the Tucker Act is only a jurisdictional statute and does 
not independently create any substantive rights enforceable 
against the United States for money damages.  Testan, 424 U.S. 
at 398; DiLuigi v. Kafkalas, 584 F.2d 22, 23 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 This is problematic for Scheafnocker=s claim for money 
damages. 
 
 “[I]t is well settled that there is no Tucker Act 
jurisdiction over a claim founded solely on a fifth amendment 
procedural due process claim, because „[t]he Due Process 
Clause simply cannot be read to mandate money damages be 
paid.‟”  Radin v. United States, 699 F.2d 681, 685 n. 8 (4th Cir. 
1983) (quoting Alabama Hospital Association v. United States, 
656 F.2d 606, 609 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).  Therefore, even if we were 
to dismiss this cause without prejudice so that it might be filed 
in the Court of Claims, or authorize the plaintiff to waive 
damages in excess of $10,000 to enable the District Court to 
hear the claim, Scheafnocker does not have a basis to claim a 
substantive right to money damages.  As a result, we conclude 
that the District Court does not have jurisdiction to consider 
Scheafnocker=s constitutional due process claim, to the extent 
she seeks monetary relief. 
 
 Scheafnocker, however, also requests a purely procedural 
remedy.  In her prayer for relief she states the following:  “that 
this Court provide opportunity for Plaintiff to show all evidence 
and proof.”  Complaint 3, ECF No. 1.  She seeks an opportunity 
to present her challenge to the levy so that it can be judged on its 
merits, a  review that she asserts was foreclosed because the lack 
of notice prevented her from filing the claim earlier.   
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 As noted earlier, the United States government has 
sovereign immunity from suits against it except where Congress 
has expressly articulated an exception.  Becton, 215 F.3d at 345. 
 Certainly, district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. ' 1331.  Although this broad grant of 
authority encompasses causes such as Scheafnocker‟s, the 
paramount issue in this case is whether it can be said that 
Congress has expressly waived sovereign immunity for the type 
of claim raised here.  We conclude that it has. 
 
 In 1976, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. ' 1331, 
eliminating the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in cases where the 
suit is filed against “the United States, any agency thereof, or 
any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.”  28 
U.S.C. 1331 Historical and Statutory Notes; see also Pub. L. No. 
94-574.  Simultaneously, Congress amended 5 U.S.C. ' 702 (the 
Administrative Procedures Act) to its current form, which states 
the following.   
 
A person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning 
of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof. An action 
in a court of the United States 
seeking relief other than money 
damages and stating a claim that an 
agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an 
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official capacity or under color of 
legal authority shall not be 
dismissed nor relief therein be 
denied on the ground that it is 
against the United States or that the 
United States is an indispensable 
party.  
 
5 U.S.C. ' 702.   
 The amendment to section 702 was described as 
“remov[ing] three technical barriers to the consideration on the 
merits of citizens‟ complaints against the Federal Government, 
its agencies or employees.”  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656 (1976).  
One “technical barrier” addressed in the amendment was 
“remov[ing] the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to 
judicial review of federal administrative action otherwise 
subject to judicial review.”  5 U.S.C.A. ' 702, Historical and 
Statutory Notes.  Moreover, in reference to the 1976 amendment 
to section 1331, the Supreme Court said “[t]he obvious effect of 
this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes 
created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on 
federal courts to review agency action, regardless of whether the 
APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate.”  
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).  Finally, we note 
that, in 1980, Congress amended section 1331 again, eliminating 
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in all federal question claims. 
 Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-486; see H.R. Rep. No. 96-1461 (1980).  We read in 
these amendments an unmistakable, express intent by Congress 
to create an exception to sovereign immunity precisely in cases 
in which a person raises a non-monetary claim, such as a 
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constitutional due process claim, against an agency of the 
federal government. 
 
 We are aware that the amendments to Section 1331 and 
Section 702 “[do] not confer authority to grant relief if any other 
statute granting consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the 
relief which is sought.”  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656.  Typically, 
suits that challenge the procedures used by the Internal Revenue 
Service to collect taxes are blocked by the Anti-Injunction Act.  
The Act prohibits any suit that seeks to “[restrain] the 
assessment or collection of any tax . . . .”  26 U.S.C. ' 7421(a).10 
 Yet, in this case, the government levied the bank account in 
2003.  Joanne Scheafnocker‟s suit does nothing to restrain the 
collection of taxes because the funds in the account were long 
ago applied to Fred Scheafnocker=s tax debt, making the Anti-
Injunction Act bar inapplicable here.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the District Court has jurisdiction to consider 
Scheafnocker‟s due process claim. 
 
 Nonetheless, to survive the government=s motion to 
dismiss, Scheafnocker=s complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to “„state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 
                                                 
10
 “Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 
6213(a), 6225(b), 6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 
6694(c), 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 7436, no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax 
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not 
such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” 
 26 U.S.C. ' 7421(a).  
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(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  Specifically, Scheafnocker must plead sufficient 
facts to assert a taking of her property by the government 
without „“notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.‟”  Nu Look Design, Inc., 356 F.3d at 295 (quoting 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 
  
 Scheafnocker pleads, and the government concedes, that 
the government levied funds from a bank account jointly held by 
Scheafnocker and her ex-husband.  We find that this sufficiently 
pleads both a property interest and a Ataking@ that invokes 
constitutional due process rights.  See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 
F.2d 50, 56 (3d Cir. 1980).  Scheafnocker also pleads that she 
was completely unaware of the levy, asserting in her complaint 
that the government never notified her of the levy, and that she 
did not discover it until she attempted to make a deposit to the 
account after the statute of limitations for wrongful levy claims 
had passed.  We conclude that these facts amply plead a claim 
that the government violated the constitution by failing to 
provide her notice that was reasonably calculated to apprise her 
of the levy.  For all of these reasons, we hold that her complaint 
provides enough facts to ground a plausible due process claim.   
 
 The remaining question is whether we should consider 
the merits of this matter, or remand the cause to the District 
Court to address the due process issue in the first instance.  We 
note that there was no motion for summary judgment filed and 
that there is no indication that the parties have engaged in 
discovery.  Rather, this appeal was brought before us after the 
District Court=s ruling on a motion to dismiss, or in the 
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alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.  Further, the factBif it 
is indeed a factBthat bank statements are normally sent to 
account holders on a monthly basis could be taken to support the 
conclusion that the Government=s efforts are Areasonably 
calculated@ to afford account holders notice of a levy.  See 
Kaggen v. Internal Revenue Service, 71 F.3d 1018, 1020 (2d 
Cir. 1995); cf. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“The criterion is not 
the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable 
character of the requirements, having reference to the subject 
with which the statute deals.”) (citation omitted). 
 
Thus, we believe the District Court should develop the 
factual record as to whether there was in this case “notice 
reasonably calculated” to apprise co-owners of levied assets of 
the levy.  Nu-Look Design, Inc. 356 F.3d at 295 (quoting 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).  In this regard, the record should be 
developed to show, among other things:  (1) whether and, if so, 
when Scheafnocker ever received notice from the bank (as 
opposed to the Government, which concedes that it never sent 
her notice); (2) whether the bank sent notice to Scheafnocker; 
(3) whether Scheafnocker kept the bank apprised of any changes 
of address that she may have made; (4) whether it is the bank‟s 
normal practice to send notice to joint owners of an account, 
either on a monthly basis or when an account has been levied; 
(5) what the common practices of other banks are in terms of 
sending notice; and (6) what the IRS=s understanding is of 
banks= practices in terms of sending notice to joint owners of 
accounts.  For these reasons, we will vacate the order of the 
District Court and remand the cause for further proceedings that 
are consistent with this opinion.  
 1 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
  
Although I concur in the holding that the District Court 
erred by dismissing the due process claim, I disagree that a 
remand to the District Court to consider the due process claim is 
warranted.1  Indeed, while noting that “[t]he constitutionality of 
the levy procedure [section 7426] . . . „has long been settled‟” 
the Supreme Court specifically invited a review of the very legal 
question Scheafnocker now raises.  United States v. National 
Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 721 (1985) (quoting Phillips 
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931)).   
 
The Supreme Court described the levy process as “an 
effective and inexpensive administrative remedy for the return 
of property.”  National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 728.  
Yet, in a crucial footnote, the Court also said the following. 
 
We do not pass upon the 
constitutional questions that were 
addressed by the District Court, but 
not by the Court of Appeals, 
concerning the adequacy of the 
notice provided by ' 6343(b) and ' 
7426 to persons with competing 
claims to the levied property.  
There is nothing in the sparse 
record in this case to indicate 
whether Ruby and Neeva Reves 
were on notice as to the levy, or as 
to what the Government‟s practice 
                                                 
1 I would remand for different reasons.  See infra.  
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is concerning the notification of 
codepositors in this context.  As the 
parties are free to address this issue 
on remand, the dissent‟s concerns 
on this score . . . are decidedly 
premature. 
 
Id. at 728 n. 12.  In contrast to National Bank of Commerce, the 
record in this case does provide us with answers to factual 
questions unknown to the Supreme Court in that case. 
 
   Indeed, the controlling facts of this claim are not in 
dispute.  First, the government admits that it levied the bank 
account that is at the center of this case.  Second, as the 
government concedes, Scheafnocker sufficiently pleads an 
ownership interest in these levied funds:  a property interest that 
invokes constitutional due process rights.  Third, Scheafnocker 
states that she never received any notice from the government.  
Finally, the government admits that it never notified 
Scheafnocker of the levy.  From this, it is clear that 
Scheafnocker has presented sufficient allegations to ground a 
claim that the levy was unconstitutional for purposes of 
procedural due process analysis.  See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 
F.2d 50, 56 (3d Cir. 1980).  Indeed, I would hold that it is 
irrelevant whether the bank statements were sent to 
Scheafnocker.  All they would indicate, after the fact and 
possibly too late to take action, is that someone had snatched the 
funds.  It would not provide any information about the nature of 
the taking or the process that is available to challenge the levy.  
In contrast, a Notice of Levy is prospective in nature, alerting 
the co-owner that the government has taken control of assets and 
will convert them, absent objections.  It would also inform the 
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co-owner of the established procedure that is available to object 
to the levy.  
 
In my view, all that remains here is a legal determination: 
 whether the government=s failure to notify Joanne Scheafnocker 
of the levy violated her constitutional right to due process.  I 
conclude that it does, and in the interest of judicial economy we 
should proceed to the merits of her claim. 
 
With regard to the merits of this case, there is a clear 
facial contradiction between the government=s total failure to 
apprise Scheafnocker of the levy and the fundamental 
constitutional right to „“notice reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”‟  Nu Look Design, Inc. v. C.I.R., 356 F.3d 290, 295 
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).  In the face of such a 
glaring incongruity, the government does not provide any 
legitimate reason for its practice.  Its assertion that it is not 
authorized to notify non-taxpayer co-owners of the levy is 
incorrect.  The wrongful levy process is set out in 26 U.S.C. ' 
7426 and 26 U.S.C. ' 6343, separate from the levy process 
provisions, which delegate authority to the Secretary to make 
determinations about wrongful levy claims. 2  As a result, the 
                                                 
2 “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay 
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be 
lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum 
as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy . 
. . (d) Requirement of notice before levy.--(1) In general.--Levy 
may be made under subsection (a) upon the salary or wages or 
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most that can be said is that the statute is silent with respect to 
the provision of notice to non-taxpayer co-owners about the levy 
and their right to challenge it. 
 
The government also errantly argues that Congress 
expressed its intent to place the burden of discovering the levy 
upon the co-owner.3  The government reasons that the nine-
month statute of limitations applicable to the wrongful levy 
process, 26 U.S.C. ' 6532(c), can be read to infer a 
Congressional intent to impose a burden of diligent oversight on 
                                                                                                             
other property of any person with respect to any unpaid tax only 
after the Secretary has notified such person in writing of his 
intention to make such levy.”  26 U.S.C. § 6331.  The lack of 
mention of notice to non-taxpayer co-owners is not, of itself, 
evidence of a Congressional intent to withhold authority to 
notify such parties. 
 
3. “(c) Suits by persons other than taxpayers.--(1) General rule.--
Except as provided by paragraph (2), no suit or proceeding 
under section 7426 shall be begun after the expiration of 9 
months from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to 
such action. (2) Period when claim is filed.--If a request is made 
for the return of property described in section 6343(b), the 9-
month period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be extended for a 
period of 12 months from the date of filing of such request or 
for a period of 6 months from the date of mailing by registered 
or certified mail by the Secretary to the person making such 
request of a notice of disallowance of the part of the request to 
which the action relates, whichever is shorter.”  26 U.SC. § 
6532. 
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the co-owner, rather than a duty of notice on the government, 
because nine months is long enough for a co-owner to discover 
the levy.  See Dieckman v. United States, 550 F.2d 622, 624 
(10th Cir. 1977). 
 
 I do not find support for this inference and, 
moreover, I do not agree with it.  Constitutional due process 
strictures may sometimes be onerous.  That, however, does not 
empower the government to ignore them. “[I]t does not follow 
that the State may forego even the relatively modest 
administrative burden of providing notice by mail to parties who 
are [able to monitor their assets].”  Mennonite Board of Missions 
v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800 (1983).   
  
The Supreme Court said the following in reference to 
notice by publication, a method of notice that at least requires a 
modicum of effort on the part of the government to provide 
information to stake holders. 
 
“Where the names and post office 
addresses of those affected by a 
proceeding are at hand, the reasons 
disappear for resort to means less 
likely than the mails to apprise 
them of its pendency.” 
 
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-213 (1962) 
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318).  Such reasoning is all the 
more compelling in a circumstance such as this where the 
government is claiming that it does not have any affirmative 
duty to notify a co-owner of an asset it intends to take.  
  
 Indeed, the very fact that Congress explicitly crafted 
section 7426 as an exception to sovereign immunity 
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demonstrates, in my view, a Congressional resolve that—even in 
light of the pressing need for a quick, efficient process to collect 
back taxes—the levy process would not run rough-shod over 
legitimate property interests of non-taxpayer co-owners.4  For 
these reasons, I would hold that the government‟s position, 
reading the statute as eschewing any need or obligation to 
affirmatively provide notice of the levy to non-taxpayer co-
owners, is constitutionally untenable. 5  Mindful that due process 
is a constitutional guarantee, not a “legislative grace” (Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)), I read the statute as vesting 
the Secretary with the responsibility of deciding claims of 
wrongful levy in a manner that is consistent with all 
constitutional mandates, including notice.  The statute, as 
written, does not run afoul of the constitution. 
 
However, on the question of whether the government has 
implemented the statute in a manner that is consistent with 
constitutional guarantees, I conclude that it has not.  The 
government relies upon comments to the regulation as authority 
for its current practice.  Yet, from my review, the only definitive 
                                                 
4 See also Terrell v. C.I.R., 625 F.3d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(Internal Revenue Service must use “reasonable diligence” to 
provide notice to “innocent spouse” of opportunity to appeal 
denial of relief from an assessment.).  
  
5 Where differing interpretations of a statute are possible, we 
must read it to preserve its constitutionality.  Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights  v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 
229 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
190 (1991).  
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exclusion of notice to non-taxpayers is found in the regulations 
implementing section 6331, the tax levy process, where it states 
the following:  “Q-A1. Who is the person to be notified under 
section 6330?  A-A1 . . . A pre-levy or post-levy CDP 
[collection due process] Notice . . . will be given only to the 
taxpayer.”  26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(a)(3).  The regulations do 
not separately address the wrongful levy process, leading me to 
question whether, even here, any authoritative basis exists for 
the government to refrain from providing notice to non-taxpayer 
co-owners. 6 Nonetheless, taking the government=s argument at 
face value, I conclude for the reasons that follow that its 
implementation of the statute does not conform to the mandates 
of due process.   
 
                                                 
6
 Although the official comment to the regulation narrows notice 
of the levy only to taxpayers, we note that the regulations are, at 
best, ambiguous on co-owners of levied assets.  Beyond the 
taxpayer, the only persons explicitly discussed in the regulations 
are “known nominees of, persons holding property of, or 
persons holding property subject to a lien with respect to, the 
taxpayer.”  See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(a)(3)(Q-A2, A-A2; Q-
B5, A-B5).  The regulations make clear that these persons will 
not receive either notice or any due process hearing.  Id.  While 
the affirmative statement in A-A1 of the regulation delineates 
who will receive notice, the complete failure of the regulations 
to affirmatively and specifically reference co-owners of levied 
assets, or to cross-reference section 7426, is a lacuna that casts 
doubt on whether the rights of co-owners were considered when 
the procedures were constructed. 
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“[R]esolution of the issue whether the administrative 
procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are 
affected.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).  
Specifically, three factors are examined. 
  
First, the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the government‟s 
interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.  
  
Id. at 335.  Here, the first prong is satisfied because there is no 
real dispute that ownership of funds in a bank account is a 
property interest that is subject to constitutional due process 
protection.  See, e.g., Finberg, 634 F.2d at 56.   
 
 Regarding the second prong, the facts of this case provide 
a patent demonstration of the danger created by the present 
wrongful levy scheme.  Scheafnocker became aware of the levy 
fourteen months after it occurred, well after the statute of 
limitations for a wrongful levy claim had tolled.  As a result, 
unsurprisingly, all of her subsequent attempts to challenge the 
levy were deemed barred.  Scheafnocker, therefore, was not only 
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deprived of the funds in her bank account as a result of the 
government=s levy, but also denied any process by which the 
merits of her challenge to the levy could be heard.  Because the 
government admits that it does not, and will not notify non-
taxpayer co-owners of levied assets, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is apparent and ongoing. 
 
With respect to the third prong, the usual arguments 
employed against burdening the government‟s tax collection 
efforts with additional procedural requirements are not 
applicable here.  Notice would not hamper the government‟s tax 
collection efforts in any way because, as noted in National Bank 
of Commerce, the levy process established in section 7426 is 
provisional.  The levy itself does not vest the government with 
an ownership interest.  Rather, it is an extraordinary measure—
as an alternative to the normative judicial process—in which the 
government wrests control of the asset from the taxpayer to 
prevent any subterfuge that would place the property out of the 
reach of the government.  The disposition of ownership of the 
asset is not conclusively determined until after the period for a 
wrongful levy challenge has expired.  National Bank of 
Commerce, 472 U.S. at 721.  Therefore, providing notice to co-
owners that their property has been provisionally seized under 
emergent circumstances would not delay the levy, nor would it 
forestall the date upon which the time bar for a wrongful levy 
closes, because the statute of limitation to challenge the levy 
runs from the date of the levy.  26 U.S.C. ' 6532(c).   
 
For all of these reasons, and with all three prongs of the 
Mathews analysis satisfied, I conclude that both governmental 
and public interests support a holding that the administrative 
procedures at issue here are constitutionally infirm.  The failure 
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of the Internal Revenue Service to provide any notice of the levy 
to Joanne Scheafnocker, a non-taxpayer co-owner of property 
levied pursuant to section 6331, violated her constitutional right 
to due process.  
 
Lastly, the government argues in the alternative that, even 
if the lack of notice is a constitutional violation, Scheafnocker‟s 
delay in filing her complaint before the District Court eliminates 
any argument that her claim was timely.  This is, essentially, a 
harmless error argument. 
   
The government notes that, in the Taxpayer Advocate‟s 
denial of Scheafnocker‟s original request for assistance, there 
was notice of her right to appeal to the District Court, along with 
a recitation of the statutes dictating the time-frame in which this 
appeal must be filed.  Scheafnocker, instead, filed her appeal 
with the Tax Court.  It was only after the Tax Court dismissed 
her appeal that she filed a complaint with the District Court.  
This filing occurred outside of the statutory time limit, even if 
the date on which the statute began to run is calculated from the 
day on which she filed the Taxpayer Assistance Order, IRS 
Form 911, with the Taxpayer Advocate.  26 U.S.C. § 6532(c).  
The government argues, as a result, that Scheafnocker cannot 
claim that she suffered any harm from the original lack of 
notice. 
 
The fundamental problem with this argument, however, 
is that the government‟s original failure to give Scheafnocker 
timely and appropriate notice of the levy prevented her from 
receiving any review or hearing on the merits of her wrongful 
levy claim.  Therefore, the after-the-fact notice of her appeal 
options that she received in the Tax Advocate‟s denial of her 
 11 
 
claim is of no consequence to our analysis.  Her claim was 
already fatally undermined by the statute of limitation, a point 
that was made clear by the decision of the District Court.  Given 
the centrality of the lack of notice to the subsequent failure of 
her wrongful levy claim, an error that precluded any review of 
Scheafnocker‟s claim on the merits, this constitutional violation 
cannot now be deemed harmless.  See Loui v. Merit Systems 
Protection Board, 25 F.3d 1011, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 
For all of these reasons, I would vacate the decision of 
the District Court and remand this cause for a hearing on the 
merits of Joanne Scheafnocker=s wrongful levy claim.   
